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KA UPP v. TEXAS: BREATHING LIFE INTO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1843 (2003)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kaupp v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment was violated when police officers, without probable
cause, went to Robert Kaupp's house in the middle of the night, awakened
him, handcuffed him, and brought him to the police station for questioning.'
The Court found that a reasonable person in Kaupp's position would not
have believed he was free to leave, or otherwise terminate the police
encounter.2 Thus, based on the record before the Court, the Court would
have suppressed a confession made as a result of this illegal seizure, thereby
reaffirming Fourth Amendment jurisprudence protecting citizens from
unreasonable search or seizure.
3
This Note argues that the Supreme Court correctly decided Kaupp v.
Texas. The circumstances surrounding Kaupp's seizure and subsequent
confession exceed the boundaries set by the Supreme Court of a reasonable
seizure. While the Fourth Amendment applies to both searches and
seizures, this Note will focus on seizures only. This Note first examines the
history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and some recent developments
in the Supreme Court's interpretation of seizures. Using these standards,
this Note will argue that the Court's finding that a seizure occurred was
correct, and the Court properly concluded that Kaupp's confession should
have been suppressed because a blatant Fourth Amendment violation had
.occurred. Finally, this Note will discuss how the Kaupp decision has
affected lower courts' Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
I 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1845 (2003) (per curiam).
2 Id. at 1847.
3 Id. at 1848. The Court required the state to "point to testimony undisclosed on the
record before us, and weighty enough to carry the state's burden despite the clear force of
the evidence shown here" in order to avoid suppression of Kaupp's confession. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE MAKING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment was the colonists' response to the unlimited
intrusions by the British government into their privacy in the 1700S. 4 Using
a Writ of Assistance, British customs officials were able to enter any home
and search the premises for evidence of customs violations.5 These officials
did not need "to have particularized suspicions about any person or place
before searching, nor were they required to justify their actions to any
authority after the search."'6  The Framers found these unchecked
governmental actions by the British unacceptable.7 To ensure that their new
government would not have this type of arbitrary power, and to protect
against the recurrence of these unchecked governmental actions, the
Framers included the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, granting the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 8 The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
9
B. REMEDIES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
The Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment in preventing unreasonable seizures not as doing away with all
police contact with the citizenry, but as prohibiting arbitrary police
interference into a citizen's privacy and personal security.l° If a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs, the person subjected to the unreasonable
search or seizure is entitled to a remedy. Historically, the remedy existed in
the world of tort, and any evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search
4 Alan C. Yarcusko, Brown to Payton to Harris: A Fourth Amendment Double Play by
the Supreme Court, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 253, 257-58 (1992).
' Id. at 257.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 257-58.
8 Id.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554-55 (1976).
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or seizure was still admissible."1 Other remedies were also available,
including bringing an action for civil trespass.
12
The exclusionary rule, which suppresses evidence unlawfully obtained,
began with Boyd v. United States13 and was the result of the Court's rule-
blending-the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of illegal seizures and the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition of compelled self-incrimination.1 4 In Boyd,
the Court held that illegally seized evidence could not be used in a criminal
trial.' 5 While later Courts did not accept this fusion of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, the exclusionary rule remained as a remedy to a Fourth
Amendment violation.' 6 Courts, however, are sometimes hesitant to use
this rule in cases where the evidence illegally obtained is "inherently
trustworthy."' 7
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TODAY
The Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule continue to serve
legitimate purposes today. To allow police officers or other government
officials to conduct searches and seizures at their own discretion would
result in the arbitrary and unjustified intrusions that the Framers feared.' 8
The exclusionary rule also serves to preserve judicial integrity and to deter
illegal police activity. 19  By keeping evidence obtained as a result of a
constitutional violation out of the courtroom, the integrity of the courts will
not be harmed. 20  Further, assuming police officers desire criminal
convictions, if they know that any unconstitutional activity that occurs
while acquiring evidence prevents that evidence from reaching the
courtroom, then they will be less likely to commit these constitutional
11 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 20-22 (1997). Amar feels the modem Supreme Court has made the exclusionary
rule an "awkward and embarrassing remedy" that has distorted the remedies available for
Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 20.
12 Id. at 20-21.
'3 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
14 AMAR, supra note 11, at 22.
15 See William D. Levinson, Supreme Court Review: Fourth Amendment-A Renewed
Plea for Relevant Criteria for the Admissibility of Tainted Confessions: Taylor v. Alabama,
73 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1408, 1411 (1982).
16 AMAR, supra note 11, at 24-25.
17 See Yarcusko, supra note 4, at 267 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907
(1984)). Where the court feels that the exclusionary rule will have no deterrent effect, such
as instances where the police act in good faith in carrying out a warrant later found invalid,
the court may choose not to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 266-67.
18 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-86 (1980).




violations. 21 The following cases serve to illustrate the evolution of Fourth
Amendment law and the suppression of resulting confessions as related to
unreasonable seizures.
1. Determining Whether a Seizure of a Person is Unlawful
The Supreme Court has looked to various factors to determine whether
an illegal, or unreasonable, seizure has occurred. The Court has balanced
several considerations, such as probable cause, the location of the arrest,
and whether one would feel free to leave the police encounter, in order to
determine whether a seizure was reasonable. Further, the Court has
considered whether the situation also requires the balancing of exigent
circumstances such that an otherwise unreasonable seizure should be
deemed reasonable. Examples of circumstances the Court has recognized
as exigent include being under life-threatening circumstances, being in hot
pursuit of a suspect by the police, and having the need to preserve
evidence.22
a. Requirement of Probable Cause
In order for a police officer to seize a person without violating the
Fourth Amendment, the officer must have probable cause. "For there to be
probable cause, the facts must be such as would warrant a belief by a
reasonable man.' 23 To make such a determination, courts should consider
24the detaining officer's expertise and experience. Detaining a person
without probable cause for a custodial interrogation "intrudes so severely
on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger
the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest., 2 5
The analysis of probable cause involves considering the totality of the
circumstances.26 In Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court recognized that in
the past it had allowed a warrantless arrest where police relied on an
informant's tip that was reasonably corroborated through the police's own
work.27 The Court looked to the veracity, reliability of the informant as
well as the informant's basis of knowledge to determine whether or not
21 id.
22 Carmine V. Capasso, Supreme Court Reduces Constitutional Guarantees Found in
Fourth Amendment-Illinois v. McArthur, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 615, 618 n.27 (2003).
23 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 149 (3d ed. 2000).
24 Id.
25 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979).
26 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
27 Id. at 241-42 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960)).
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probable cause was present. 28  The presence of probable cause would
indicate that a search or seizure was reasonable. 29 The Court favored the
totality of the circumstances test because it was consistent with the process
of obtaining a warrant.
3 0
In Dunaway v. New York, the Supreme Court found a Fourth
Amendment violation where probable cause did not support the defendant's
detention. 1 In Dunaway, police officers could not get a warrant to arrest
the defendant.32  Nevertheless, the officers located him, took him into
custody, and brought him to the police station for questioning about a recent
murder. 33 The officers did not tell Dunaway that he was under arrest, but
would have physically restrained him if he had tried to leave.3 4 He was
given his Miranda warnings after being put in an interrogation room.35
After questioning, he made some incriminating statements and sketches.3 6
The Supreme Court, in deciding Dunaway, made an effort to point out
the special circumstances that led to the departure from traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis articulated in Terry v. Ohio as the stop-and-frisk
exception. 37 In Terry, the Court allowed a police officer to stop a suspect
and frisk him for weapons with only reasonable suspicion and no probable
cause. 38 In a stop-and-frisk situation like the one in Terry, the Court felt
that the degree of police intrusion was a great deal less severe than the
degree of police intrusion associated with a traditional arrest. 39 Thus, the
28 Id. at 230.
29 Id. at 236-37. The Court reaffirmed the "traditional standard for review of an issuing
magistrate's probable-cause determination" which required the magistrate to have a
"'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing" in order to avoid a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. (quoting Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
30 Id. at 235-36. "[Miany warrants are... issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-
sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more
formal legal proceedings." Id.
3" 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979).
32 Id. at 203.
" Id. at 202-03.
34 Id. at 203 (citing Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 116-17, People v.
Dunaway, No. 78-5066 (Monroe County Ct., Mar. 11, 1997)).
35 id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 207-11; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court in Terry found that a stop-
and-frisk scheme "amount[ed] to a mere 'minor inconvenience and petty indignity,' which
can properly be imposed upon the citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the
basis of a police officer's suspicion." 392 U.S. at 10-11 (quoting People v. Rivera, 201
N.E.2d 32, 36 (N.Y. 1964)).
" 392 U.S. at 10-11.
39 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209.
2004]
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Court did not deem the stop-and-frisk an arrest and did not require a
showing of probable cause for such an encounter.40 The Court recognized
that a seizure occurs "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away" and that such a seizure "may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment" on the person being seized.4 '
However, in determining the reasonableness of a seizure, the Court
balanced the need for the governmental intrusion against the suspect's
privacy rights.42 In the case of a stop-and-frisk, the governmental interests
of preventing and detecting crime outweighed the limited privacy invasion
of the suspect.43 Therefore, in Terry, the officer's seizure of the suspect
was reasonable as long as he had reasonable suspicion that the suspect was
armed. 44  The Court in Dunaway held that, unlike the stop-and-frisk
situation of Terry, Dunaway's detention was a traditional arrest.45 Thus,
probable cause was required and its absence indicated that the Fourth
Amendment had been violated.46
In some cases, a warrant is not necessary if both probable cause and
exigent circumstances are present at the time of the seizure. 47 Courts have
found such a seizure reasonable even though the police did not have a
warrant.48 In Illinois v. McArthur, the Supreme Court held that where
probable cause existed, the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment
when prohibiting a man from going into his home while a search warrant
was obtained.49 The Court recognized that a warrant was not necessary in
certain cases, such as "[w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs,
diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like .. .
In McArthur, the measures that the police took were reasonable in light of
the special law enforcement need of preserving evidence.5' McArthur's
temporary detainment outside his home was reasonable because: (1)
probable cause existed; (2) the evidence would likely be destroyed if the
officers had to wait to obtain a warrant; (3) the officers reasonably
accommodated McArthur's privacy interests; and (4) the detainment was
40 Id.
4" Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17.
42 Id. at 20-21.
41 Id. at 22-24.
44 Id. at 27, 30.
45 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212.
46 Id. at 216.
47 Capasso, supra note 22, at 615.
48 Id.
49 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001).
so Id. at 330.
5' Id. at 334.
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for a limited time (two hours).52 This warrantless seizure was less intrusive
than a warrantless arrest and thus not a Fourth Amendment violation.53
b. Location of the Warrantless Arrest: Privacy of the Home
Another factor the Supreme Court has considered in determining the
legality of a warrantless arrest is the location of the arrest. The Court has
traditionally been very protective of intrusions into the private home and
has subjected to a greater scrutiny those cases involving an intrusion into
the privacy of the home.54 In Payton v. New York, the Court stated that
reasonable warrantless arrests occurring in a public place would not
necessarily be reasonable if the same arrest occurred in a private home.5 5
The Court made this distinction because the Fourth Amendment specifically
provides for protection of persons in their houses: "the physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed. '56 The sanctity of the home was an important concern of the
Framers; therefore, any seizure inside a home carried a presumption of
unreasonableness.
57
About four years later, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court
expanded the Payton holding.58  The Court reaffirmed the rule that
warrantless home arrests were allowed only if the crime was a felony, and
probable cause and exigent circumstances existed. 59 This rule made the
presumption of unreasonableness harder to rebut when the warrantless
home arrest was for a minor offense.60  Such a minor offense existed in
Welsh, where the defendant was arrested for a civil traffic offense.6' The
52 Id. at 331-33.
13 Id. at 332, 336.
54 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-11 (1999) (recognizing the importance
of the "centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home" and applying the
"basic principles of the Fourth Amendment" to the defendant's situation); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-87 (1980);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (noting that "[t]he right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society
which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance"). Cf Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 337 (2001).
" 445 U.S. at 576.
56 Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)).
7 Id. at 583-86.
58 466 U.S. 740 (1983).
9 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 741-42, 749 n.ll.
60 Id. at 750.
61 Id. at 754.
2004]
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Court held that this arrest was unreasonable because of the special Fourth
Amendment protections of an individual in the home.
62
However, when the Court finds the presence of exigent circumstances,
a warrantless seizure affecting the privacy of the home is not per se
unreasonable. 63 In United States v. Santana, the police were in hot pursuit
of the defendant when the defendant fled to her house. 64  The police
followed her into her house where they arrested her and discovered heroin
on her.65 The Court found the warrantless home arrest to be reasonable
since the chase had begun in a public place, the officers were in hot pursuit,
and a realistic concern about the destruction of evidence existed.66
Further, the Supreme Court has found that a police officer's visit to an
individual's home, which results in the transportation of the individual to
the police station without his consent, without probable cause, and without
prior judicial authorization, constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. 67 In
Hayes v. Florida, the police wanted to question Hayes about a series of
burglary-rapes occurring in the area. 68 The police officers did not have
probable cause, nor did they seek or obtain a warrant approving of this
encounter. 69  The officers wanted to take Hayes to the station for
fingerprinting, but Hayes was reluctant to go. 70 Hayes did not agree to go
until after the officers told him that they would arrest him if he did not
comply with their request.71 The Court found that the encounter exceeded
the limits authorized by Terry v. Ohio.72 Thus, a violation of the Fourth
Amendment had occurred since the defendant did not consent to being
transported to the police station, and the officers did not have probable
cause or a warrant to justify their conduct. 73
c. Restraint of Movement: Free to Leave Test
In determining whether or not the Fourth Amendment was violated,
the Supreme Court has also looked to the degree of restraint on an
62 Id.
63 See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 337 (2001).
64 427 U.S. 38, 40-42 (1976).
65 Id. at 40-4 1.
66 Id. at 42-43.
67 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814-15 (1985).
6 Id. at 812.
69 Id. at 812-13.
70 id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 814.
73 Id.
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individual's freedom of movement. The greater the restraint on an
individual's freedom of movement, the more a police encounter will seem
like an illegal seizure. The Court has set forth a totality of the
circumstances test to determine whether an individual will feel free to leave
during a police encounter.74
In United States v. Mendenhall, the Court "adhere[d] to the view that a
person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or a show of
authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. 7 5 The Court concluded
that an unreasonable seizure occurs
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that
might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.
76
The Court did not find an unreasonable seizure in Mendenhall.77  Since
Mendenhall's initial encounter with the federal agents occurred in a public
place, no weapons were displayed, the officers were not in uniform, and the
officers only asked to see Mendenhall's identification and ticket, the Court
found that this did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. 8 In
addition, Mendenhall's subsequent visit to the airport DEA office where she
was further questioned and searched also did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation because there were no threats and she was not told
that she was required to go to the DEA office. 79 The Court found that the
totality of the circumstances test did not warrant a finding of a Fourth
Amendment violation.
80
The Court again considered what constituted an arrest in Florida v.
Bostick.8' In Bostick, the Supreme Court emphasized the applicability of
the totality of circumstances test to all police encounters, regardless of
whether the encounter "take[s] place on a city street or in an airport
lobby ... [or] on a bus." 82 The police encounter in Bostick consisted of two
74 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 227-35 (1973) (discussing voluntariness in the context of consent to police
searches).
75 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
76 Id. at 554.
7 Id. at 555.
78 Id.
"9 Id. at 548-49, 557-58.
'0 Id. at 557-58.
"' 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
82 Id. at 439-40.
2004]
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police officers boarding a bus to look for drugs and asking the defendant if
they could search his bag.83 While the Court did not decide whether this
encounter constituted a seizure,84 it
adhere[d] to the rule that, in order to determine whether a particular encounter
constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the
encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter.8
5
The Court held that being approached by a police officer and asked a few
questions did not constitute a seizure as long as a reasonable person would
have believed he was "free to leave" or had the ability not to answer the
officer's questions.8 6 The point of view of a reasonable person was that of
an innocent person.87 Here, the Court found that the defendant's freedom of
movement was not restricted by police conduct, but by his independent
decision to ride a bus.88  Since being on the bus restricted Bostick's
movement such that he would likely not feel free to leave the police
encounter, the proper analysis was to determine "whether a reasonable
person [in Bostick's position] would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."
8 9
More recently, in California v. Hodari D., the Court reemphasized that
an arrest occurs when any physical force-in the form of "laying on of
hands" or restraint of movement-is applied or when the defendant submits
to an assertion of authority.90 Therefore, in the absence of physical force,
when there has been no submission to authority, an arrest has not
occurred. 91 The Court noted that the Mendenhall test was an objective one
since a show of authority is established only when the officer's conduct
conveys to a reasonable person that his movement is restricted, and not
when the suspect believes that his movement has been restricted.
92
In Hodari D., the defendant was chased by two police officers who
were suspicious after he began running upon seeing the officers' car
approaching. 93 Before one of the officers apprehended Hodari D., he threw
13 Id. at 431.
84 Id. at 437.
85 Id. at 439.
86 Id. at 434 (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).
87 Id. at 438.
" Id. at 436.
89 Id.
9' 499 U.S. at 626. This proposition was first stated in Terry. See id. at 625.
91 See id. at 626.
92 Id. at 628.
93 Id. at 622-23.
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away a small item that turned out to be crack cocaine.94 The Court held that
at the time Hodari D. discarded the item, he was not under arrest; thus, the
drugs could not be excluded as the fruit of an illegal seizure.95 Hodari D.
did not submit to the authorities until after he had discarded the drugs, since
the arrest did not occur until the officer tackled him.96 The Court was
reluctant to expand the Fourth Amendment and the definition of seizure to
include situations where the police officer is in hot pursuit of the suspect.97
2. Determining Whether Fruits of an Illegal Seizure Should be Suppressed
After deciding that an illegal seizure has occurred, courts must
determine if any evidence obtained as a result of the illegal seizure should
be suppressed. Despite some strong criticism,98 courts continue to use the
exclusionary rule, a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, which
requires the suppression of evidence obtained as fruit of an illegal seizure.
However, the rule is not applied in every case where there is a Fourth
Amendment violation, since suppression of evidence obtained as the fruit of
an illegal seizure is not "a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." 99  Courts look to various factors to determine whether the
exclusionary rule should apply.100
a. Birth of the Attenuation Analysis in Relation to Confessions
The Supreme Court first considered whether a confession should be
excluded as the fruit of an illegal arrest in Wong Sun v. United States.
01
The Court recognized that "[tihe exclusionary rule has traditionally barred
from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct
result of an unlawful invasion."' 0 2 Included in these "physical, tangible
materials" is verbal evidence such as confessions.'0 3
In Wong Sun, Wong Sun and James Wah Toy, were illegally arrested
and had pretrial statements prepared for them in the form of confessions.1
0 4
14 Id. at 623.
9' Id. at 629.
96 Id.
9' Id. at 627.
98 See AMAR, supra note 11, at 20-31.
99 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
1oo See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
'0' 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 23, at 508.
102 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485.
103 Id. at 485-86.
104 Id. at 476, 484, 49 1.
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In both cases, the Court looked at the surrounding circumstances to decide
whether the statements obtained were each "sufficiently an act of free will
to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion."'
0 5
In Toy's case, the oral statements he made to police officers following
his unlawful arrest were held to be protected by the exclusionary rule.'
0 6
The Court considered the surrounding circumstances of the illegal arrest,
including the facts that: (1) six or seven police officers chased Toy as he ran
toward his living quarters; (2) the police did not attempt to get an arrest
warrant; and (3) the police never stated the purpose of their presence. 0 7 In
light of these circumstances, the Court found that Toy's statements were not
admissible because they were not an act of free will, and no intervening
independent act had occurred to warrant a contrary conclusion.'
0 8
However, the Court found that an intervening independent act existed
in Wong Sun's case. 0 9 Since Wong Sun was released from custody and
returned on his own accord a few days later when he made the statement,
the Court held "that the connection between the arrest and the statement had
'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint..... Under the attenuation
analysis and in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances, his
statement was an act of free will and therefore admissible."'
b. Further Development of the Attenuation Analysis
The "attenuation analysis" set forth in Wong Sun was muddied after
Miranda v. Arizona, where the Supreme Court held that "[p]rior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.'l2 As a result of this holding, lower courts began to consider
only whether or not a defendant received his Miranda warnings when
deciding the admissibility of confessions. 13  Even in cases where the
confession was obtained through an illegal arrest, some courts did not
undergo the attenuation analysis, which was required of courts after Wong
15 Id. at 486, 491.
'06 Id. at 487.
'0' Id. at 480-83.
'0' Id. at 486.
'0o Id. at 491.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
113 Yarcusko, supra note 4, at 270.
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Sun.' 14 However, the Supreme Court reemphasized and elaborated on the
attenuation analysis in Brown v. Illinois.'
5
In Brown, police officers wanted to question Brown about a murder
since he was an acquaintance of the victim, but did not have probable cause
or a warrant when they arrested him." 6 The officers held him at gunpoint
as he was about to enter his apartment, and told him he was under arrest.,
7
The police brought Brown to the police station, where he was given the
Miranda warnings." 8  After being questioned, he eventually signed a
written statement admitting his participation in the murder.1
9
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's conclusion that the
reading of the Miranda warnings by itself was sufficient to remove the taint
of the illegal arrest and make the statements a product of the defendant's
free will.120 Since "Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always
make the act [of confessing] sufficiently a product of free will . . . [and
cannot break] the causal connection between the illegality and the
confession," the Court turned to the specific facts of the case.' 2' In its
attenuation analysis, the Court considered the following factors: (1) whether
the Miranda warnings were given; (2) "the temporal proximity of the arrest
and the confession;" (3) "the presence of intervening circumstances;" and
(4) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct ... ,122
Consideration of these factors in Brown's case supported the finding that
Brown's confession was the fruit of an illegal seizure.' 23 Although Brown
received the Miranda warnings, his statement occurred no more than two
hours after his illegal arrest. 24 In addition, no significant intervening event
occurred during this time.125 Further, the misconduct of the officers was
purposeful and flagrant-the officers knew that they did not have probable
cause or a warrant when they arrested Brown and apprehended him in a




115 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
116 Id. at 591-92.
... Id. at 593.
118 Id. at 594.
119 Id. at 594-95.
120 Id. at 603.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 603-04.
123 Id. at 604-05.
"' Id. at 604.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 605.
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About fifteen years later, in New York v. Harris, the Supreme Court
held that "where police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the
exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by the
defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an
arrest made in the home in violation of Payton." 127 The police in Harris
had probable cause to believe that Harris was a murderer.' 2 8 Police officers,
without obtaining an arrest warrant, went to his apartment and entered after
displaying their guns and badges. 129 Inside his apartment, Harris was read
his Miranda rights and subsequently confessed to the killing. 30 He signed
a written inculpatory statement at the police station after he was again given
his Miranda rights.' 
31
The admissibility of the written statement was in dispute. 32 While the
Court admitted that Harris's warrantless home arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment, it declined to find all evidence obtained as a result of the
illegal seizure per se inadmissible. 33 The Court distinguished this case
from Brown because the police officers had probable cause to arrest the
defendant in Harris. 134 In order to apply the attenuation analysis set forth in
Brown, "the challenged evidence [must be] in some sense the product of
illegal governmental activity."' 35 Since the police officers in this case had
probable cause, there was no underlying illegality and thus no need to apply
Brown's attenuation analysis.
36
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In January 1999, a fourteen year old girl, Destiny Thetford,
disappeared. 37 Her half-brother, Nicholas Thetford, was a suspect because
the police discovered that he and Destiny had a sexual relationship.
38
Nicholas and Robert Kaupp, the defendant, had been together on the day of
Destiny's disappearance.' 39  The Harris County Sheriff's Department
127 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990).
128 Id. at 15.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 16.
131 id,
132 id.
131 Id. at 17.
134 Id. at 18-19.
135 Id. at 19 (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).
136 Id.
137 Kaupp v. Texas, No. 14-00-00128-CR, 2001 WL 619119, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. June 7,
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questioned both Nicholas and Kaupp. 140  After cooperating, Kaupp was
allowed to leave; however, "[Nicholas] failed a polygraph examination ....
[He] [e]ventually confessed that he had fatally stabbed his half sister and
placed her body in a drainage ditch." 141  In his confession, Nicholas
implicated Kaupp in her death.
1 42
In response, police officers tried to obtain a pocket warrant to question
Kaupp, but failed.143 The officers admitted that they did not have probable
cause for Kaupp's arrest, which is why they did not seek a conventional
arrest warrant. 44  Further, the officers did not have any evidence that
corroborated Nicholas Thetford's implications of Kaupp's involvement.
45
Nonetheless, they attempted to find Kaupp and question him. 146  At
approximately 3:00 a.m., "[s]ix police cars along with a large number of
officers arrived at the Kaupp home and stationed themselves around the
house in various locations."'' 47 Three police officers knocked on the door of
the Kaupp home. 148
Kaupp's father answered the door, and the officers asked for his son.
49
The officers went to Kaupp's bedroom and one officer shined a flashlight
on Kaupp. °50 One officer stated, "[w]e need to go and talk," whereupon
Kaupp replied "okay."' 5 ' Kaupp was then handcuffed and led out of his
house "shoeless and dressed only in boxer shorts and a T-shirt."' 52
Unknown to Kaupp, one officer believed that Kaupp was under arrest at the
time he was handcuffed.
5 3
Kaupp was put in a patrol car and taken to the police station after a
brief stop at the site where the victim's body had been found. 54 The police
140 Id.
141 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1844-45.
142 Id. at 1845.
143 Id. The police officers described a "pocket warrant" as giving them "authority to take
Kaupp into custody for questioning." Id. at 1845 n. 1.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1845.
147 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Appellant at 1-2, Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1843
(2003) (No. 02-5636) [hereinafter Appellant's Petition].
148 Id.
141 Id. at 2.
1s Id.
s ' Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
1s2 Id.
1s5 Kaupp v. Texas, Cause No. 803,792 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Cause
No. 803,792] (court's findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding admissibility of
statement).
154 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
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stated that they made the stop to let Kaupp know that Nicholas had told
them where Destiny's body could be found. 155 Further, they wanted to
show Kaupp where the body was because they were going to confront
Kaupp with Nicholas's confession once they got to the police station. 156 At
the station, Kaupp was taken into an interview room, had his handcuffs
removed, and was advised of his Miranda rights.' 57 At first, Kaupp denied
any involvement in the murder.' 58 However, after being told of his friend's
confession, he signed a confession admitting to participating in the crime. 1
59
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY,
TEXAS
Kaupp entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder.' 60 The jury
found him guilty and sentenced him to fifty-five years imprisonment in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.' 61 During his
trial, Kaupp moved to suppress his confession, but was unsuccessful. 62 In
ruling on the admissibility of Kaupp's confession, the district court stated
that Kaupp's reply of "okay" constituted consent because it showed that
Kaupp realized that he was going to be questioned at the police station.
1 63
In addition, at the police station, Kaupp was read his Miranda rights, which
he understood and waived.164 Thus, the court found, as a conclusion of law,
the confession Kaupp gave after the 3:00 a.m. visit to his house "was given
freely and voluntarily ... [without] coercion, threats, violence nor promise
made to the Defendant in exchange for his agreeing to give said
statement."'' 65 Since the confession was not coerced and the police did not
arrest Kaupp before he gave his confession, it was not the fruit of an illegal
arrest and thus admissible.'
66
155 Kaupp v. Texas, No. 14-00-00128-CR, 2001 WL 619119, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. June 7,
2001) (not designated for publication).
156 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
157 Id.
158 Id.
'59 Appellant's Petition at 2, Kaupp (No. 02-5636).
160 Kaupp, 2001 WL 619119 at *1.
161 Id.
162 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
163 Cause No. 803,792, supra note 153, at 3.
'6 Id. at 3-4.
165 Id. at 5.
166 Id.
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B. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Kaupp appealed his conviction on the grounds that his confession
should have been suppressed.1 67 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's refusal to suppress the confession.' 68  The court held that the
appropriate test for whether Kaupp consented to the police encounter was to
determine if "a reasonable person would feel free to 'disregard the police
and go about his business. The totality of the circumstances must be
considered in making the determination of whether consent was
voluntary.17
0
The court of appeals looked at the totality of the circumstances and
concluded that Kaupp consented to the encounter because "a reasonable
person in [Kaupp's] situation would have felt free to say 'no' or otherwise
to disregard [the detective] and go about his business."'17' First, Kaupp's
statement of "okay" signified his consent to going to the police station for
questioning. 72 Second, although Kaupp was handcuffed, the court found
that no bright-line test existed that equated handcuffing with an arrest.
73
Since Kaupp was familiar with the procedure of handcuffing as a safety
measure because he had ridden in a patrol car the previous day, the court
failed to find that he had been arrested.174 In addition, the court found
Kaupp's failure to resist the police or otherwise act uncooperatively pointed
toward the finding that Kaupp did not believe he was under arrest. 75 After
considering all of these circumstances, the court found that Kaupp was not
under arrest before he confessed. 76  Since no arrest had occurred, his
confession could be admitted because it was not the product of an illegal
arrest. 77 Kaupp again appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,
but was denied discretionary review.' 78  The Supreme Court granted
Kaupp's writ of certiorari to decide whether his confession should have
been suppressed.
167 Kaupp v. Texas, No. 14-00-00128-CR, 2001 WL 619119, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. June
7, 2001) (not designated for publication). Kaupp also appealed on two other grounds, which
are irrelevant for this discussion.
16 Id. at *3.
169 Id. at *3 (quotations omitted).
170 Id. (citing Lackey v. State, 638 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).
171 Id.
172 Id.




177 Id. at *2.
178 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
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V. SUMMARY OF OPINION
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
the state court of appeals and held that Kaupp's confession must be
suppressed unless the state had undisclosed evidence that would overcome
the evidence on the record.17 9 The Court found that Kaupp had been
illegally arrested prior to his confession.' 80 Further, his confession should
have been suppressed because it was not a product of his free will and thus
was a fruit of an illegal arrest.'
8 1
The Court followed the test outlined in Mendenhall and Bostick to
determine that a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment had
occurred. 82 The Court stated that the totality of the circumstances must be
considered to determine whether or not a reasonable person would have felt
that he could have ignored the police presence and continue about his
business.' 83 If a reasonable person under these circumstances would have
felt that he could not have ignored the police presence, then an
unreasonable seizure occurred. 184 According to Mendenhall, courts should
consider certain circumstances including "the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled."' 185 In this case, the Court found every circumstance from
Mendenhall to be present.' 86 At least three police officers awakened Kaupp
in the middle of the night. 87 Physical touching occurred as Kaupp was
handcuffed and taken from his home to the police car.' 88 In addition,
Kaupp did not consent to the arrest. 89 His statement of "okay" after being
told by one of the officers that "we need to go and talk" was not a
manifestation of his consent under these circumstances. 90 The Court
viewed Kaupp's statement of "okay" as "a mere submission to a claim of
lawful authority."' 9' Further, the Court found that no "reasonable person in
"9 Id. at 1848.
"So Id. at 1847.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1845-46.
'8 Id. at 1845.
184 Id.
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[Kaupp's] situation would have thought he was sitting in the interview
room as a matter of choice, free to change his mind and go home to bed. 192
Since his confession was not "an act of free will sufficient to purge the
primary taint of the unlawful invasion," it had to be suppressed., 93 The
Court considered the factors outlined in Brown in determining that the
confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest.' 94 The Court found that the
only factor weighing against suppression was that Kaupp had been given
his Miranda warnings. 195 However, for the purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis, Miranda warnings alone are not enough to sever "the causal
connection between the illegality and the confession."'' 96 In considering the
other factors, the Court found that little time had passed between the illegal
arrest and the confession, there were no meaningful intervening
circumstances, and the officers knew that they did not have probable cause
to arrest Kaupp.' 9' Thus, the confession had to be suppressed absent further
evidence to the contrary. 98
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court correctly decided to suppress the confession in
Kaupp. The lack of probable cause, the invasion of the privacy of the
home, and the application of the free-to-leave test all point to the conclusion
that the police illegally seized Kaupp. The attenuation analysis of the
exclusionary rule demonstrates that the appropriate remedy to this Fourth
Amendment violation is the suppression of Kaupp's confession.
Furthermore, the tests and analyses that the Court sets forth in Kaupp
provide clear precedent to lower courts as to how to analyze cases involving
the Fourth Amendment and unreasonable seizures. The Court has not
always been protective of Fourth Amendment rights, 199 however, when
faced with Kaupp's situation, the Court had no choice but to come to the
conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. Kaupp
increased the Supreme Court's awareness of the existence of police conduct
192 Id.




197 Id. at 1848.
198 Id.
199 The Court has applied its tests and analyses to find that the seizure was reasonable
and not a Fourth Amendment violation in cases where strong privacy interests are present.
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (stating that "[t]he facts of this
case ... leave some doubt whether a seizure occurred"); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 555 (1980).
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that violates the Fourth Amendment and the need for courts to scrutinize
more closely such conduct. As a result, a lesser degree of deference may be
given to police conduct where the constitutionality of the police conduct is
in question.
A. THE PRINCIPLES OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
RENDER THE COURT'S DECISION CORRECT
The Court's holding here appears to be the obvious conclusion,
making it a somewhat "unremarkable" decision.200  The details of the
Houston police's visit to Kaupp's home are striking in how every
circumstance points toward the occurrence of an unreasonable seizure.
The police did not have probable cause when they entered Kaupp's home.
Further, a reasonable person in Kaupp's position would not feel free to
leave the presence of the police. Allowing this seizure would not be in
accordance with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment-to protect those
who desire to live without arbitrary government intrusion.20 2 These factors
all point toward the conclusion that Kaupp's Fourth Amendment rights
were violated and that his confession should be suppressed. Even though
the Court often narrowly construes the scope of Fourth Amendment
rights,0 3 Kaupp's police encounter constitutes an arbitrary government
intrusion that meets all of the various Supreme Court standards in showing
that a seizure occurred and the subsequent confession should be suppressed.
1. Kaupp was Illegally Seized
The Court's finding that Kaupp was seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment was proper. While the Court has had varying views of
200 Craig M. Bradley, Texas 'Justice', 2003 SuP. CT. REv. 64, 64. What Mr. Bradley did
find remarkable was "that this blatant violation of the law by the Houston police was upheld
by the Texas Court of Appeals, causing the U.S. Supreme Court to abandon its usual role of
resolving conflicts among the lower courts to instead right a wrong in an individual case."
Id.
20 See Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1846-47.
202 See Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1810 (1994) (stating the
effects of arbitrary government intrusion to be that "human personality deteriorates and
dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any
hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police") (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
203 Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 20 (2003) (stating that "the general trend is to narrow the scope of Fourth
Amendment rights and, even when such rights are recognized, to narrow still further when
the exclusionary remedy will be available to enforce the Amendment").
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what constitutes an arrest,20 4 it has generally looked to at least one of the
following factors: whether probable cause existed for the arrest; whether the
arrest occurred in the home or a public place; and whether a reasonable
person in the individual's position would feel free to leave the presence of
the police.
a. The Police Did Not Have Probable Cause to Seize Kaupp
The degree of police intrusion that Kaupp experienced exceeded that
of the stop-and-frisk scenario in Terry where the police officer approached
the suspect on the street.2 °5 Thus, the police needed to show probable cause
in order to justify their encounter with Kaupp. The police failed to make
such a showing.
First, probable cause cannot be found from the informant's, Nicholas
Thetford's, tip. The application of the totality of the circumstances test of
Gates to Nicholas's implication of Kaupp in the murder of his half-sister
does not result in a showing of probable cause. 20 6 While Nicholas likely
had a basis of knowledge to make the implication because he and Kaupp
were together the day Destiny was murdered, the other considerations-
veracity and reliability of the informant-weigh toward a showing of no
probable cause because Nicholas's confession could not be authenticated
and he did not prove himself to be trustworthy or reliable. Nicholas had
failed three polygraphs earlier that day,20 7 which indicates that he has a
propensity to lie. Although Nicholas revealed the location of his half-
sister's body, the police were able to corroborate his story by going to the
named location and finding her body. 20 8 However, the police, through its
own work, could not reasonably corroborate Nicholas's implications of
Kaupp's involvement'in the murder. 20 9 Considering the totality of these
circumstances, Nicholas's tip cannot demonstrate that the police had
probable cause to arrest Kaupp.
204 See Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an "Arrest" Within the Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. R. 129, 141-66 (2003). Clancy finds
[t]he Supreme Court's pronouncements of what constitutes an arrest within the framework of the
Fourth Amendment are numerous and irreconcilable. Since 1968 .. .numerous "visions" of
what constitutes an arrest have been set forth, with little or no attempt to harmonize the concept
set forth in one case with competing visions in other cases.
Id. at 142.
205 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1968).
206 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).
207 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845 n.1.
208 Id. at 1845.
209 Id. at 1845 n.1.
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Second, the police did not have a warrant for Kaupp's arrest. Since a
warrant is only issued upon a showing of probable cause, the absence of a
warrant indicates that the police did not have probable cause.210  The
"pocket warrant" that the police attempted to obtain was denied.21 The
police did not even attempt to obtain a conventional arrest warrant.212 The
inability to obtain a warrant for Kaupp's arrest or detainment for
questioning shows that the police did not have probable cause to arrest
Kaupp.
Third, even if probable cause was present despite the failure to secure
a warrant, no exigent circumstances existed that would cause the Court to
find that the warrantless seizure was nonetheless reasonable. None of the
"special law enforcement needs" stated in McArthur were present in
213Kaupp's situation.   Kaupp did not have any diminished privacy
expectations. He was asleep in his home and likely did not feel he had any
less privacy than usual. In addition, the police intrusion Kaupp experienced
was by no measure minimal. The presence of six or seven police officers
and several patrol cars at 3:00 a.m. at Kaupp's home cannot be considered
minimal. Kaupp was also handcuffed and taken to the police station-
again, this does not constitute a minimal intrusion. Further, the
preservation of evidence was not a concern like it was in McArthur because
the police merely wanted to question Kaupp and did not have a reasonable
concern that Kaupp may be destroying evidence.
Lastly, Kaupp's situation is very similar to the defendant's experience
in Dunaway. Like Dunaway, Kaupp was picked up and brought to the
police station to be questioned about a recent murder.21 4 Another similarity
is that the police in Dunaway were also unable to obtain an arrest warrant.
Like Dunaway, Kaupp was put in an interrogation room and given Miranda
warnings. In Dunaway, the Court found that the police conduct violated the
Fourth Amendment. Similarly, the Court in Kaupp found a Fourth
Amendment violation, and the similarity of the police conduct in these two
scenarios supports this finding.
210 A warrant can be evidence that probable cause for the arrest exists since the Fourth
Amendment requires that "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause ...... U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 23, at 166.
211 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
2.2 Id. at 1845 n.1.
213 See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001).
214 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1979).
[Vol. 94
KA UPP v. TEXAS
b. The Police Seized Kaupp in his Home
Another factor that the Court has considered in its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is the location of the arrest. Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence must balance an individual's privacy expectations against the
government's law enforcement interests.21 5 The Court generally is more
protective of seizures that result from a warrantless police intrusion into a
private home.
In this case, Kaupp's expectation of privacy in his own home exceeded
the government's interest in law enforcement, especially since the police
were unable to obtain a warrant to arrest him. If Kaupp's seizure had been
deemed legal, then police officers would be able to approach almost anyone
at three o'clock in the morning in their homes to bring them in for
questioning after another suspect, without corroboration, implicated them in
a crime. The public would be at a greater risk of being the target of such an
arbitrary government intrusion. These types of arbitrary governmental
intrusions were the "chief evil" that the Framers were concerned about and
wanted to prevent from occurring.2t 6 Allowing these intrusions would
signify the Court's failure as the branch of government that sets "a
constitutional floor protecting individuals and constraining government.
21 7
Even if probable cause were present, no exigent circumstances existed
to justify the police intrusion into Kaupp's home. Although Kaupp was to
be questioned regarding a felony offense, and not a minor traffic violation
like the defendant in Welsh v. Wisconsin, no exigent circumstances were
present. Unlike the defendant in Santana, Kaupp did not flee from the
police nor were the police in hot pursuit of Kaupp at the time of his arrest.
Kaupp had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his home, which the police
intruded upon.
Kaupp's transportation to the police station further indicates that a
Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Like the defendant's "consent" in
Hayes, Kaupp's statement of "okay" did not constitute consent to being
transported to the police station.218 The police officers in Kaupp, like the
officers in Hayes, did not have probable cause nor judicial authorization of
215 Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After Hodari
D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1991).
216 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
217 Taslitz, supra note 203, at 28 (quoting Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48
DUKE L.J. 787, 787 (1999)) (noting that all branches of government have simultaneous duties
to respect all citizens and enforce the law).
218 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 813 (1985).
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their conduct2 1 9 Thus, the officers' transport of Kaupp to the police station
to obtain evidence weighs toward a conclusion of an illegal seizure.
c. The Police Conduct Failed the Free-to-Leave Test
A reasonable person in Kaupp's position during the police encounter
would not have felt that he was free to leave. The police's show of
authority and use of physical force in going to Kaupp's home, awakening
him, handcuffing him and transporting him to the police station demonstrate
that a seizure occurred. Under the analysis set forth in Mendenhall and
Bostick, Kaupp's seizure was unreasonable.
Handcuffing Kaupp restrained his freedom of movement, and the
handcuffs were not removed until Kaupp was taken to the interrogation
room.22 ° This physical contact constituted the physical force necessary to
find an arrest. Further, Kaupp submitted to the officers' show of authority.
The police officers showed their authority by arriving en masse at Kaupp's
home and telling Kaupp that "'we need to go and talk.' 22' Kaupp
submitted to this show of authority by answering "'okay"' and getting out
of bed to go to the police station with the officers.2 22 His lack of struggle
with the officers evidences his submission.223
Kaupp also likely felt that he was unable to leave this police presence.
All of the factors in the Mendenhall are present, and the totality of the
circumstances communicated to Kaupp that he was not free to leave. These
factors have probative value even in the absence of resistance to the police.
The first factor, "the threatening presence of several officers," is met by the
presence of six or seven officers in addition to several patrol cars.2 4 Three
officers entered Kaupp's home, which constitutes a "threatening presence,"
especially since they authoritatively entered Kaupp's home in the middle of
the night. The second factor, the display of a weapon, is disputed because
the parties disagree on whether a weapon was displayed. 2 5 Nonetheless,
the officers showed their authority by handcuffing Kaupp and leading him,
shoeless, outside to the patrol car. This conduct satisfies the third factor of
219 See id. at 812.
220 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
221 See id.
222 See id. at 1845, 1847.
223 See id. at 1847.
224 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
225 The state court of appeals stated that the officers were armed and that one officer's
weapon was visible at the time they confronted Kaupp in his bedroom. Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at
1846 n.3. However, "at least one officer testified before the trial court that they went to
Kaupp's house unarmed." Id.
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the presence of physical touching. The officer's statement of "we need to
go and talk" fulfills the last factor, "the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled. ' 26 The officer's statement does not give Kaupp any indication
that he could refuse the officer's request. Instead, it implies that Kaupp
would be forced to "go and talk" even if he resisted the request.
A reasonable person, when faced with these factors and circumstances,
would not feel free to leave this police presence. After being awakened in
the middle of the night at home and confronted with six or seven police
officers, a reasonable person would likely feel that she would be compelled
to obey the police. Further, after being handcuffed and led to the patrol car
in nothing more than a T-shirt, boxer shorts, and socks, a reasonable person
would conclude that she was not free to leave or otherwise terminate this
police encounter.
2. The Court Appropriately Applied the Exclusionary Rule
The Court's finding that Kaupp's confession should be suppressed was
also proper. The primary sanction for Fourth Amendment violations is the
exclusionary rule.22 7 The application of the attenuation analysis was
appropriate because here, unlike the absence of an underlying illegality in
New York v. Harris, an underlying illegality had occurred-the seizure
despite the absence of probable cause. Since Kaupp's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated, correctly applying the exclusionary rule will further
the purposes of the rule.
a. The Court's Holding Achieves the Purposes of the Exclusionary Rule
Both purposes of the exclusionary rule are realized through the
exclusion of Kaupp's confession. One purpose of such a rule is to deter
police officers from illegal conduct.2 28 The other purpose is to maintain the
integrity of the judiciary. 229
First, the suppression of Kaupp's confession will serve to deter future
police conduct of this nature. Knowing that this type of conduct will not be
226 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
227 Yarcusko, supra note 4, at 266.
228 Id.
229 Id. This policy justification has been weakened in Leon, where "the Court held that
evidence was admissible where it was seized by police officers acting in good faith reliance
on a warrant later found to be invalid." Id.; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
The Court did not consider preservation of judicial integrity a concern, and only looked to
the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule as a justification for suppressing evidence.
Yarcusko, supra note 4, at 267.
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tolerated by courts will serve to encourage police -officers to respect an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights.230 This will make officers more
likely to obtain a warrant or at least more likely to make sure that probable
cause is present before a seizure occurs. Otherwise, any evidence or
statements that they obtain as a result of this illegal seizure will likely be
suppressed. A stronger adherence to the exclusionary rule, exemplified by
the suppression of Kaupp's confession, increases the incentive for police
officers to obtain the proper judicial authorization before becoming
involved in such encounters with suspects. This incentive increases
because a stronger adherence to the exclusionary rule will also increase the
probability that any evidence obtained will be excluded from trial.
In addition, judicial approval of such police conduct would diminish
the integrity of the courts. The public would lose confidence in the
judiciary as the defender of the Constitution if courts allow tainted evidence
to be admissible at trial. The police would become the boundary-setters of
the Fourth Amendment, a job reserved for the courts. Even though the
exclusionary rule at times makes it more difficult to convict guilty
defendants, courts that strongly adhere to the exclusionary rule demonstrate
the judiciary's commitment to preventing unjustified governmental
*231intrusions.
b. The Attenuation Analysis was Correctly Applied
Application of the attenuation analysis, which was first outlined in
Wong Sun and then elaborated on in Brown, to Kaupp's situation results in
the conclusion that his statements should have been suppressed. The
Supreme Court reached this same conclusion, 32 and a closer examination of
the Brown factors233 reveals that the Court's decision was proper. After the
Court correctly determined that Kaupp was illegally seized, it next had to
determine whether his confession should be suppressed. In accordance with
"well-established precedent," the Court recognized that Kaupp's confession
had to be suppressed "unless that confession was 'an act of free will
[sufficient] to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion."' 234 The
facts of Kaupp's case must be closely looked at because even though he
was given his Miranda warnings, this factor is not dispositive, and alone
230 See Taslitz, supra note 203, at 28.
231 See id. at 86.
232 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1847-48.
233 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
234 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1847 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486
(1963)).
[Vol. 94
KA UPP v. TEXAS
cannot assure that the Fourth Amendment has not been violated.2 35 The
attenuation analysis requires a more searching examination of the following
factors-the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, the presence
of any intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the
officers' misconduct.236
First, the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession point toward
the exclusion of the confession. Kaupp confessed after about ten or fifteen
minutes in the interrogation room, 237 and his confession occurred after the
police officers presented him with his friend's (the victim's half-brother's)
238confession. A substantial amount of time had not passed between
Kaupp's awakening by police officers and his subsequent confession. He
was put into a patrol car shortly after being roused from sleep.2 39 The only
stop made before arriving at the police station was a detour to the site where
the victim's body was being recovered. 240 Thus, the temporal proximity of
the seizure and confession does not remove the taint of the illegal seizure
and does not make the confession a product of Kaupp's free will.
Second, no intervening circumstances were present. No event
occurred to make Kaupp believe that he was not under arrest. In addition,
the officers did not do anything to make him feel that he was not under
arrest. They had him handcuffed and led out of his house in the middle of
the night with nothing on except boxer shorts and a T-shirt-he did not
even have his shoes on.241 The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to
show that Kaupp's confession was voluntary. However, the state has not
put forth any evidence that a "meaningful intervening event" occurred
which would purge the taint of the illegal arrest.242 This factor also points
toward the conclusion that the confession was not a product of Kaupp's free
will.
The third factor, the purpose and flagrancy of the officers' misconduct,
also points toward suppression of Kaupp's confession. The Supreme Court
did not discuss this factor in its opinion in Kaupp. However, the Court
likely felt that this factor also pointed toward suppression. 24' Like the
235 See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603.
236 See id. at 603-04.
237 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
238 Cause No. 803,792, supra note 153, at 5.
239 Appellant's Petition at 2, Kaupp (No. 02-5636).
240 Id.
241 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
242 Id. at 1848.
243 Id. at 1847-48. The Court stated the Brown factors, including this third factor-the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. at 1847. The Court then went on to
state that the Brown factors, with the exception of the giving of the Miranda warnings, point
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officers in Brown, the police officers here knew that they could not obtain a
warrant before going to Kaupp's house.24  Despite being refused the
warrant, the officers nevertheless decided to get Kaupp into custody and try
to obtain a confession from him. 245 Even one of the police officers believed
that Kaupp was being placed under arrest.246  Thus, the officers quite
purposefully decided to engage in this misconduct. Further, the officers'
misconduct was flagrant. Having six police cars arrive at Kaupp's house
and stationing a large number of officers at various locations around
Kaupp's house appear to be flagrant showings of police power.247 Three
police officers knocked on the front door, and upon finding Kaupp, began
to handcuff him. 248 The handcuffs were not removed until he was placed in
the interrogation room. 249 The officers even searched his house.250 These
events demonstrate the purposefulness and flagrancy of the officers'
misconduct and, like the police encounter in Brown, the events in the
present case were "calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.
251
A more detailed attenuation analysis of Kaupp's case shows that the
Supreme Court's conclusion was correct. 252 After considering all of the
factors, Kaupp's confession cannot be deemed to be an act of free will
because all of the factors, with the exception of the reading of his Miranda
rights, demonstrate that the primary taint of the illegal seizure had not been
purged. No event had occurred to break the causal connection between the
police officers' illegal conduct and Kaupp's subsequent confession.
B. THE COURT'S USE OF THE MENDENHALL TEST GIVES LOWER
COURTS A CLEARER STANDARD AND SENDS THE MESSAGE THAT
FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
The Supreme Court's decision in Kaupp provided support for two tests
concerning Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the reasonable person test
regarding seizures stated in Bostick and derived from Mendenhall,253 and
the attenuation analysis regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained as
toward the conclusion that "the causal connection between the illegality and the confession"
had not been broken. Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975)).
244 Id. at 1845; see Brown, 422 U.S. at 605.
245 Appellant's Petition at 2, Kaupp (No. 02-5636).
246 Cause 803,792, supra note 153, at 3.
247 Appellant's Petition at 2, Kaupp (No. 02-5636).
248 Id.
249 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845.
250 Appellant's Petition at 2, Kaupp (No. 02-5636).
251 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975).
252 See Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1847-48.
253 Id. at 1845-46.
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a result of an illegal arrest from Wong Sun and Brown.2 5 4 These tests have
been used by the lower courts to determine respectively whether a person
has been illegally seized outside of the permissible limits of Terry and
whether evidence obtained as a result should be admissible. The Supreme
Court also realized the potential widespread nature of Fourth Amendment
violations due to a courts' finding that a person's submission to authority
constitutes consent to the seizure.2 55 The lower courts have taken this into
consideration when applying the reasonable person test 256 and attenuation
analysis. 7  As a result, many of these decisions have recognized the
sanctity of the Fourth Amendment and have been protectionist toward
individuals in order to prevent illegal and/or arbitrary intrusions.258
1. Lower Courts are Recognizing the Importance of Protecting Fourth
Amendment Rights
Lower courts, like the Supreme Court, have recognized that "the
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed. 2 59  Further, lower courts have also
acknowledged that "[the police] may [not] seek to verify [mere] suspicions
by means that approach the conditions of [a full custodial] arrest.2 6° Some
254 Id. at 1847.
255 Id. The Court plainly stated that "Kaupp's 'okay' in response to [the police officer's]
statement is no showing of consent under the circumstances .... There is no reason to think
Kaupp's answer was anything more than a 'mere submission to a claim of lawful authority."'
Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)).
256 See, e.g., Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Evans, 582
S.E.2d 407 (S.C. 2003).
257 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 277 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Hunt v.
Commonwealth, 585 S.E.2d 827 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
258 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Arias, 344 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
district court's decision to suppress evidence obtained after a seizure that occurred without
probable cause or consent); Hatheway v. Thies, 335 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that
defendant did not consent to questioning at police station); Green, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 756
(granting defendant's motion to suppress confession evidence after only Brown factor met
was that defendant received Miranda warnings); Dejesus v. Village of Pelham Manor, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying summary judgment to defendants on ground that a
genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether or not the plaintiffs felt free to leave
during their encounter with the defendant); Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199 (Del. 2003)
(holding that detention of defendant solely based on a citizen's suspicions that he was
engaged in criminal activity insufficient to justify seizure); Evans, 582 S.E.2d 407
(suppressing confession proper after Miranda warnings not given and where defendant not
free to leave police encounter); Hunt, 585 S.E.2d 827 (finding an illegal seizure where police
officer stated that he would search defendant after handcuffing him and defendant submitted
to officer's show of authority).
259 Hayes, 794 N.E.2d at 495.
260 Hunt, 585 S.E.2d at 834 (citing Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1845).
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courts have used their own factors in determining whether a person has
been taken into custody.
For example, in State v. Evans, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
considered the following factors in its totality of the circumstances analysis:
"place, purpose, and length of interrogation, as well as whether the suspect
was free to leave the place of questioning., 261 In Evans, the defendant was
suspected of setting fire to her mobile home, which killed her three
children.262 The defendant signed a "voluntary statement" after a three hour
interview during throughout which she "remained emotionally unstable...
[and] continuously asked the agents 'to get her some help."' ' 263 Although
she was never read her Miranda rights, the court found that the totality of
the circumstances suggested that she was in a custodial interrogation
setting-she was not free to leave, an agent accompanied her to the
bathroom at all times, her cousin was not allowed to see her, she was
interviewed in a back office, the interview was of a lengthy duration, and
the purpose of the interview was to extract a confession.264
However, while some courts have recognized the importance of
preventing arbitrary governmental intrusions, they have nonetheless held
that such police encounters are lawful.265 In Hayes, the court found a
"knock and talk" investigation lawful.266 Police officers knocked on the
defendant's motel room door after receiving a tip that the defendant was
dealing drugs out of this motel room. 26 The defendant opened the door and
268let the officers in after they showed him their badges. The officers saw
marijuana on the dresser and asked to "look around the room for weapons"
whereupon they found crack cocaine in the bathroom. 269 The defendant
was arrested, and his motion to suppress the drugs obtained was denied.27 °
In determining that no illegal seizure had occurred, the court looked to the
totality of the circumstances, as outlined in Kaupp.271 The court found that
the factors considered in Kaupp (the threatening presence of several
officers, display of a weapon, physical touching, use of language or tone of
voice indicating compliance would be compelled) did not point toward an
261 Evans, 582 S.E.2d at 410.
262 Id. at 408-09.
263 Id. at 409.
264 Id. at 410.
265 See Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
266 Id.
267 Id. at 493.
261 Id. at 493-94.
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illegal seizure.272 Although several officers were present, there was no
evidence that they had "pounded on the door or had drawn their
weapons .... [or] that any of the officers [had] raised their voices or
commanded Hayes to let them into the motel room. 2 73 Although the court
recognized the intimidating nature of the unexpected arrival of armed police
officers at one's motel room door, it did not feel that the facts of this case
clearly warranted the finding that an illegal seizure had occurred.274
Once an arrest has been deemed illegal, the exclusionary rule
determines whether or not inculpatory statements made subsequent to arrest
are admissible.27' The Court's holding in Kaupp provides support for this
"well established precedent" of Wong Sun and Brown and provides
guidance for the lower courts in applying the attenuation analysis.276 For
instance, in Hunt v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held
that the defendant's admission was fruit of an illegal seizure and should be
suppressed.277 In coming to its conclusion, the court relied on the precedent
set in Kaupp, Wong Sun, and Brown in applying the Brown factors.27 8 An
off-duty police officer handcuffed the defendant in Hunt and brought him to
the apartment rental office upon finding the defendant on the premises after
he was banned from the property.27 9 He read the defendant his Miranda
rights, and a search revealed that the defendant was carrying a firearm and
cocaine. 280  The court found that although the defendant was read his
Miranda rights and the official misconduct was deemed unintentional, other
considerations, such as the temporal proximity of the arrest and the
admission and the flagrancy of the misconduct (officer's statement that
defendant would be better off if he admitted having contraband than if
officer found it), compelled the suppression of the statements.2 8 1
2. Distinguishing Between Voluntary and Coerced Consent
In Kaupp, the Supreme Court stated that Kaupp's response of "okay"
to the officer's statement of "we need to go and talk" was "no showing of




211 See Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1847.
276 Hunt v. Commonwealth, 585 S.E.2d 827, 836 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
277 id.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 829.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 836.
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such an encounter would seem to present no option but "to go. ' 282 The
Court plainly differentiated between consent to a police encounter and
"mere submission to a claim of lawful authority. 283 The Court has not
always felt this way.284  The dissent's view of the circumstances
surrounding consent in Mendenhal 285 and Bostick286 are similar to the
views of the Court in Kaupp. The Mendenhall dissent recognized that
"consent cannot be presumed from a showing of acquiescence to
authority ... ."287 Although the defendant in Mendenhall was never told
she was under arrest, "she in fact was not free to refuse to go to the DEA
office . . . . [and] would not have been permitted to leave without
submitting to a strip-search. '2 88 Thus, even though she accompanied the
police officer to the DEA office, she did not consent to this police
encounter. 289  Further, the state did not meet its burden of proving
consent-no evidence was presented that concemed "what she said, if
anything, when informed that the officers wanted her to come with them to
the DEA office.,
290
Similarly, in Bostick, the dissent considered the cramped confines of a
bus and its stops of limited duration point toward the finding that "the
passengers are in no position to leave as a means of evading the officers'
questioning., 291 The court found that the police officers displayed an
intimidating "show of authority" when they boarded the bus, visibly
displayed their badges, and where one officer had a gun in a recognizable
weapons pouch.292 The only options that the defendant had were to either
obstinately refuse to answer any questions or to leave the bus.293 Neither
option would have been feasible in this case.294 The dissent acknowledged
282 Kaupp, 123 S. Ct. at 1846, 1847.
283 Id. at 1847.
284 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980).
285 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 566-67, 574 (White, J., dissenting).
286 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 442-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 566-67 (White, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 574-75 (White, J., dissenting).
289 Id. at 576 (White, J., dissenting).
290 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
291 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
292 Id. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
293 Id. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
294 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). If the defendant refused to cooperate, it is likely that
"such behavior would only arouse the officers' suspicions and intensify their interrogation."
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Further, the defendant did not know whether the officers
would even allow him to leave the bus since leaving would entail "squeez[ing] past the gun-
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this reality and found that an illegal seizure could occur even though the
defendant's "freedom of movement was restricted by a factor independent
of police conduct-i.e., by his being a passenger on a bus. 295
The Court of Appeals of Indiana followed this line of reasoning in
Hayes v. State.296 While the court held that an illegal seizure had not
occurred, the court spent much of its opinion stressing the importance of the
Fourth Amendment and how most people would ordinarily submit to a
show of lawful authority, regardless of whether it was legal or illegal
official conduct.297 The court "agree[d] that residents of a home are not
likely to deny a police officer's request to enter, either because they are
ignorant of the law or are simply 'too stunned by the circumstances to make
a reasoned decision about whether or not to consent to a warrantless
search .... ,,298
The Court, in recognizing that consent may merely be a submission to
authority, has also recognized that coerced confessions should not be used.
The coerced confession itself, in addition to the manner in which it was
extracted, violates the Constitution.299 Such a confession is the result of an
unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 °°
"[T]he statement and its fruits are excludable from trial pursuant to the
ordinary workings of the exclusionary rule. 3 °1  The Court's increasing
awareness of the existence and dangers of manifestations of consent that do
not accurately reflect a suspect's approval of a subsequent police encounter
may lead it and lower courts to be more probative in determining whether
evidence should be suppressed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Kaupp v. Texas correctly applied the reasoning
of previous Fourth Amendment cases to determine that an illegal seizure
had occurred in Kaupp's case. The Court properly reasoned, using the
analyses set forth in Mendenhall and Brown, that the confession obtained as
wielding inquisitor who was blocking the aisle of the bus ... Id. at 448 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
295 Id. at 449 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).
296 794 N.E.2d 492, 496-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
297 id.
298 Id. (quoting State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 933 (Wash. 1998)). The Washington
Supreme Court also believed that "any knock and talk is inherently coercive to some
degree." Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 933.
299 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 59 (2002).
300 id.
301 Id. at 60.
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a result of this illegal seizure should be suppressed. The Court did not set
forth a novel approach, but rather correctly applied and reinforced
precedent. In the past, when applying this same precedent, the Court has
tended to side with the police in finding that no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred or that the evidence obtained should not be suppressed.
In finding for Kaupp, the Court balanced the intrusiveness of police conduct
with the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The Court's holding
furthers the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule,
and provides a standard of analysis that lower courts can follow, The Court
has breathed new life into the Fourth Amendment and hopefully will begin
to recognize the complete realm of protection against unreasonable seizures
that the Fourth Amendment provides.
Denise Robinson
